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Book	Review:	Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of
Political	Meritocracy	by	Mark	Bovens	and	Anchrit
Wille
In	Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of	Political	Meritocracy,	Mark	Bovens	and	Anchrit	Wille	examine	how
Western	democracies	are	shaped	by	educational	inequalities	that	lead	to	gaps	in	political	participation	and
governments	being	dominated	by	academic	elites.	While	less	sure	of	some	of	the	authors’	solutions	for	these
‘diploma	democracies’,	this	is	a	convincing	account	of	the	influence	of	education	on	political	inequality	in	Western
Europe	today,	writes	Jameel	Hampton.
Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of	Political	Meritocracy.	Mark	Bovens	and	Anchrit	Wille.	Oxford	University
Press.	2017.
Find	this	book:	
What	is	wrong	with	having	the	highest	offices	of	government	occupied	by	academic
elites?	In	the	time	of	Brexit	and	the	‘Rust	Belt	Brexit’,	the	Donald	Trump
administration,	is	this	not	preferable	to	handing	control	of	Plato’s	Ship	over	to	those
who	see	only	the	shadows	on	the	wall	of	Plato’s	Cave?	Is	this	not	the	fulfilment	of
John	Stuart	Mill	and	Edmund	Burke’s	ideal	liberal	trustee	government,	the
representative	system	that	more	or	less	dominates	‘first	world’	governance	today?
After	all,	our	leaders	were	elected,	and	in	legitimate	democracies	do	we	not	get	the
leaders	we	deserve?	What	is	wrong	with	government	being	an	education-based
meritocracy?	Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of	Political	Meritocracy	answers	these
questions	and	many	adjacent	ones	in	explaining	how	and	why	Western	European
countries	have	become	‘diploma	democracies’	and	what	can	be	done	about	it.
Mark	Boven	and	Anchrit	Wille’s	Diplomademocratie:	over	de	spanning	tussen
meritocratie	en	democratie	(2011)	examined	how	the	Netherlands	became	a	diploma
democracy.	This	book	widens	their	analysis	to	cover	Western	Europe	–	namely,	Belgium,	Britain,	Denmark,
France	and	Germany	–	as	well	as	recent	challenges	including	the	refugee	crises	and	Brexit.	Admitting	that	their
book	may	be	unfashionable	in	current	political	studies	circles,	its	purpose	is	descriptive	and,	from	the	beginning,
refreshingly	polemic:
this	is	an	argumentative	rather	than	an	explanatory	study.	The	main	aim	of	our	exercise	is	to	take
stock	of	the	education	gaps	in	political	participation	[…]	We	are	not	primarily	interested	in	explaining
political	behaviour	or	even	explaining	the	rise	of	political	meritocracy	[…]	We	are	interested	in	the
macro	effects	on	representative	democracy	of	the	dominance	of	the	well-educated	(6-7).
The	authors’	analyses	are	based	on	voting	and	elections,	other	forms	of	technological	and	traditional	political
participation,	the	involvement	of	civil	society	organisations	and	the	educational	stratification	of	political	elites.	In
their	discussion	of	‘Concepts	and	Contexts’,	‘Contours’	and	‘Consequences’,	education	has	turned	the	countries
under	examination	into	two	great	hostile	camps	–	‘cosmopolitans’	and	‘nationalists’	–	and	is	a	major	determinant
of	social	and	political	divides,	at	least	on	a	par	with,	if	not	more	powerful	than,	ethnicity,	language,	particular
regionalisms	or	religion.
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For	concepts	and	contours,	the	authors	establish	that	a	meritocracy	based	on	education	is	not	a	meritocracy.
Throughout	the	study,	their	longue	durée	analyses	contend	that	educational	elitism	is	a	new	form	of	tyranny	that
has	usurped	hereditary	privilege	and	wealth:
This	dominance	of	the	well-educated	in	political	office	is	a	relatively	modern	phenomenon.	During	the
nineteenth	and	a	large	part	of	the	twentieth	century,	political	elites	were	formed	on	the	basis	of	class
or	property	[…]	Often	they	were	better	educated	than	the	average	citizen—the	upper	classes	in
general	had	much	better	access	to	education—	but	this	was	not	the	prime	source	of	their	political
power;	that	was	based	on	status,	land	or	wealth	(112).
Education	now	guarantees	intergenerational	social	and	political	immobility	and	has	also	failed	to	wash	away	the
old	school	tie	or	popping	champagne	when	one	is	admitted	to	the	Grand	Écoles.	Top	places	for	children	from
disadvantaged	backgrounds	and	immigrant	families	are	increasingly	difficult	to	attain	today.
The	authors	usefully	identify	four	concepts	of	democracy	and	why	meritocracy	may	or	not	fulfil	them.	The
dominant	form	of	trustee	democracy	aside,	in	a	representative	democracy	political	bodies	should	be	an	accurate
microcosm	of	inclusion.	Can	the	highly	educated	sufficiently	represent	citizens	with	whom	they	have	little	contact
and	little	in	common?	Furthermore,	government	is	far	more	responsive	and	accountable	–	audit	offices,	civil
servants,	courts,	insider	connections,	legislative	bodies,	ombudsman	–	to	those	with	higher	education	and
political	power.	So	too	then	is	legitimacy,	measured	as	the	sum	total	of	the	other	three,	in	favour	of	the	highly
educated.
The	analytical	descriptions	of	the	contours	of	diploma	democracies	show	that	education	and	length	of	study	are
both	causes	of	and	proxies	for	ordinary	and	elite	political	participation.	Education,	for	the	authors,	drives	civil	and
political	engagement	as	well	as	political	cognitive	capacity,	defined	as	‘the	ability	of	individuals	to	gather
information	on	a	variety	of	subjects,	organize	facts,	and	efficiently	process	information’	(84).	Well-educated
people	tend	to	have	better	‘talking	skills’:	organising	and	participating	in	debates,	writing	letters	and	emails	and
chairing	and	participating	in	meetings.
The	authors	also	discuss	‘Astroturf	participation’	in	diploma	democracies.	NGOs	that	appear	to	be	‘grassroots’
are	in	fact	the	domain	of	educated	professionals:	highly-educated	hired	guns	who	have	the	know-how	and
connections	with	the	right	people	to	make	things	happen	on	behalf	of	their	lower-educated	client	groups.	These
people	are	selected	from	exclusive	‘pools	of	democratic	democracy’	(108).	This	is	an	especial	problem	in
countries	like	Britain,	Denmark	and	Germany	that	have	strong	traditions	of	formal	non-statutory	efforts	to	combat
social	and	economic	ills.
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For	consequences,	the	simple	thesis	about	diploma	democracy	is	that	those	with	advanced	qualifications	have
more	power	as	they	are	better	represented	and,	as	a	result,	government	will	have	an	empathetic	response	to
their	desires	and	accountability	in	government	will	be	determined	and	judged	by	cosmopolitan	standards.	The
authors	also	mention	the	troubling	disaffection	thesis:	citizens	with	low	levels	of	education	will	have
corresponding	low	levels	of	trust	in	government	because	they	feel	excluded	and	may	resort	to	conventional	or
violent	forms	of	support	for	demagogic	politicians	and	parties.	Trust	for	and	confidence	in	government	are
therefore	crucial:
Citizens	must	have	the	feeling	that	they	count,	that	their	voices	are	heard,	and	that	they	are	able	to
impact	policy.	In	a	diploma	democracy	the	well-educated	voice	resonates	much	more	strongly	at	the
ballot	box;	in	deliberative	sessions	and	expert	meetings;	in	parliaments	and	cabinets	(156).
Another	potential	consequence	is	that	the	meritocratic	class	will	continue	to	rule,	breed	and	strengthen	its
intergenerational	tyranny.	The	authors	often	appeal	to	Michael	Young’s	dystopia,	The	Rise	of	the	Meritocracy
(1958),	where	‘IQ	+	effort	=	MERIT’,	and	the	future	British	meritocratic	state	is	overthrown	by	a	rebellion	of	the
less	well-educated	classes	in	the	year	2034.	Indeed,	there	is	a	touch	of	George	Orwell	here:
The	two	educational	groups	hardly	meet	or	mingle.	The	well-educated	live	in	the	university	towns,	in
green	pre-war	suburbs,	or	in	the	nineteenth-century,	gentrified	parts	of	the	inner	cities,	whereas	the
less	well-educated	can	be	found	in	former	manufacturing	towns,	in	the	post-war	satellite	cities,	or,	in
the	twentieth-century	outskirts	of	major	cities.	Nor	do	they	mate;	educational	homogamy	has	replaced
religious	homogamy	(41).
The	final	chapter	offers	solutions	to	mollify	diploma	democracies.	The	authors	point	out	that	organised	labour	in
the	US	tends	to	be	good	at	detecting	political	talent	in	their	ranks,	and	if	populist	parties	and	other	groups	allocate
representative	positions	based	on	race	and	gender,	why	not	education?	Could	there	be	an	NGO	or	a	political
party	run	by	and	for	less	well-educated	people?	There	are	also	arguments	for	compulsory	voting,	compulsory
voting	in	one’s	first	eligible	election	and	the	disaster	that	would	be	e-voting.	Notwithstanding	the	rise	of	an
extremist	firebrand,	the	circumvention	of	representative	liberal	democracy	and	the	possibility	of	bizarre	and
indelible	results,	referenda	and	plebiscites	are	also	mentioned—ask	a	Canadian	how	close	we	came	to	losing	the
country	in	1995.	Also	suggested	is	a	house	of	government	drawn	by	a	lottery:	a	‘House	of	Lots’	(179).	The	best
solution	is	mandatory	civic	education	for	all	children,	which	should	create	persistent	rather	than	periodic
engagement	with	politics	as	adults	and	furnish	all	with	the	‘talking	skills’	for	the	task.
This	book	is	accessible	and	engaging	with	chapters	often	opening	with	humorous	anecdotes.	There	are	a	lot	of
helpful	graphs	and	tables	and	one	does	not	need	a	PhD	in	maths	to	follow	them.	Its	recommendations	aside,	this
is	a	convincing	book.	It	fulfils	its	explicit	purposes	and,	I	think,	is	good	for	undergraduate	and	graduate	students	in
primarily	English-speaking	countries	to	learn	about	how	and	why	politics,	society	and	education	are	markedly
different	in	some	of	the	countries	of	Western	Europe.
Dr	Jameel	Hampton	is	the	author	of	Disability	and	the	Welfare	State	in	Britain:	Changes	in	Perception	and
Policy,	1948-79.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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